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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JuIciAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DETERMIN-
ATIONS, AN ASPECT-PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-L'Enfant Plaza
North, Inc. v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency (D.C.
CIR. 1970).
I. THE DILEMMA
... (T)he scope of judicial review of administration action ranges
from zero to one hundred percent, that is, from complete unre-
viewability to complete substitution of judicial judgment on all
questions .... 1
So speaks but one representative authority on Administrative
Law. Such confusion and contradictory evidence exists regard-
ing the scope of judicial review of agency decisions that many treat-
ises attempt its delineation.2 Thus, on the one hand, a court grap-
pling with reviewability3 has ample federal and state sanction to
corroborate practically any desired course. On the other hand, be-
cause courts have ranged "from zero to one hundred percent,"
and because they have not established specific guiding grounds as
to the where, when and why for such range, the courts have left
themselves most vulnerable to legislative and executive attacks for
specious abuse of judiciary authority. For example, assume Con-
gress has established an agency, defined its role, and empowered it
and it alone to make the decisions necessary to fulfill its purposes.
Should the judiciary, because of a disputed agency decision, subse-
quently undertake all the agency has already done, come to a de-
cision de novo, and thereby set itself (the court) up as the expert
qualified and empowered to arrive at its own conclusion? Such ac-
tions are taken by courts and too frequently no principle is artic-
ulated as a basis. It is contended here that in at least one area of
judicial review, where an agency's actions are found to have vio-
lated procedural due process, 4 the court can establish a basis which
eliminates much confusion as to whether the court has exceeded
1. 4 K. DAvis, AmmiisTRTIvn LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1959).
2. See, e.g., 4 K. DAVIS, ADMnw'IsATrvn LAW TREATIES, entire vol. at 1-
270 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DAvis]; M. FoRKoscH, A TREATISE ON ADmIN-
ISTRATIvE LAW, Chs. 16,17,18, at 547-771 (1965). L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
or ADmINIsTRATvE AcTIoN, at 1-720 (1965).
3. "Review" will refer, hereinafter, to the judiciary's review of Admin-
istrative Agency Determinations.
4. DAvis, supra note 1 § 28.21(2).
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its constitutional authority. Thus, the premise herein is: where
a judicial finding is that plaintiff has suffered substantial harm
due to defective agency procedure, this defect should be so identi-
fied and clearly labeled as a violation of procedural due process.
When so categorized, whatever ultimate determination the court
may make, its taking jurisdiction of the matter is not subject to at-
tack upon the theory of abuse of the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers.5 The justification of this contention may best be seen by 1)
articulation of certain given assumptions and 2) illustration
through the recent case L'Enfant Plaza North, Inc. v. District of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency.6
II. ASSUMPTIONS
1) The legislature, within the enabling statute, does not excessively
delimit or preclude allowable judicial review.7 (The scope of this
article does not include those agencies created via executive en-
actment.)
2) The court has determined that the administrative decision is ripe
for review, i.e., some final agency order has been imposed or a right
denied.8
5. The doctrine, in fact, is a theory because in no document is it spe-
cifically stated. However, its validity is unquestionable since every state
constitution and the U.S. Constitution imply the separation of the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial powers. "This tripartite form of government
with each branch having its independent powers ... was simply and
naturally adopted.... The Constitution impliedly embodies this principle
of the separation of governmental powers by creating in the first three
Articles, a legislature, an executive and a judiciary ...." M. FoRKoscH,
CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW § 9 (2d ed. 1969). And, Mr. Justice Brandeis: "The
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted ... not to promote effi-
ciency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 at 293 (1926).
Therefore, unless appellate review is granted in the statute that em-
powers the administrative agency, the logical implication is that the courts
do not have the right to interfere with that agency's determinations at all,
except where the judiciary must act to uphold the Constitution; e.g., an
agency acting in violation of due process or acting ultra vires.
6. 300 F. Supp. 426 (D.D.C. 1969), at trial level; 437 F.2d 698, 270 A.2d
698 (D.C. Cir. 1970), at appeals level. (Hereinafter cited as L'Enfant).
7. Many enabling statutes are phrased so as to refuse or to limit judi-
cial review. But note that even in these instances frequently courts have
found means to circumvent. See, generally, DAVIS, supra note 1 § 28.02.
8. See, e.g., Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corporation, 333 U.S. 103, 112 (1948). "Administrative orders are not re-
3) The court has determined that the plaintiff has standing to sue.0
4) The statute delegating authority to the agency prescribed little
or no procedural machinery, i.e., wide discretion has been allowed
the agency.' 0
5) The court chooses not to "escape" via the "rational basis" test.11
II. THm FACTS
Plaintiffs (later appellants) are seven corporations owning or
leasing land within the District of Columbia Southwest Urban Re-
newal Area. The defendant is the Congressionally empowered su-
pervising agency, District of Columbia Redevelopment Land
Agency (RLA).12 Plaintiffs, pursuant to their interpretation of
language within the Urban Renewal Plan, as well as with tacit
agency assurance, planned certain retail establishments to serve the
needs of area employees. Upon Square 465, within the same proj-
ect area and nearby the plaintiffs' establishments, a large office
building was erected. The plaintiffs, to insure solvency, intended
and needed to attract the employees therefrom as customers. How-
ever, a third party, (also an intervenor in this suit), who had
leased space on the ground floor of that building, desired to operate
establishments of the same nature as those intended by the plain-
tiffs. Therefore, plaintiffs' paramount concern was that the lan-
guage of the Planning Commission Plan regarding accessory uses'8
of Square 465 should be narrowly limited to those uses enun-
ciated and not interpreted to include a full panoply of commercial
enterprises. A broad interpretation would cause substantial harm
to the plaintiffs' business and investment interests. The particular
language of the Planning Commission referred to states:
... all buildings and the premises shall be limited to offices for
governmental, professional, institutional or commercial use, and
accessory uses such as employee restaurants and off-street parking
necessary to serve the primary uses.14
Informal discussions followed, as well as exchanges of letters, the
viewable unless and until they impose... a consummation of the admin-
istrative process."
9. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
10. See, generally, M. FoRaoscH, supra note 2, § 335-47.
11. See, discussion infra note 16 and see also, DAvis, supra note 1, §
30.05 (1959).
12. 5 D.C. Code § 701 et seq.
13. Defined 12 D.C. Code § 1202. ... [a] use customarily incidental
and subordinate to the principal use and located on the same lot there-
with."
14. L'Enfant Plaza North, Inc. v. District of Columbia RLA, 300 F.
Supp. at 428 (D.D.C. 1969).
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last letter bearing the broad final agency determination that acces-
sory uses were to include the full panoply of retail establishments,
regardless of previous tacit agency assurances to the contrary. Ex-
cluded from further administrative consideration, plaintiffs filed
their action in the District Court on the merits of the construction
issue and asserted that there were other issues of fact requiring trial
that rendered the agency's determination unfounded. The defend-
ant filed a motion for summary judgment. Held at trial-grant of
defendant's motion; held upon appeal, reversal of the summary
judgment and remand to the district court for proceedings to de-
termine other issues of fact.
In view of these decisions it is important to note that the en-
abling statutes make no mention of procedural adjudicatory machin-
ery by which IRLA is to settle disputes. Also, there is no doubt as
to the wide latitude of discretion invested in this particular agency
as declared by the United States Supreme Court.15
IV. APPLiCATION
Before discussing the respective dispositions of the trial and ap-
peals courts, it must be emphasized that the recited facts conjure
the classic dilemma which courts reviewing agency decisions face:
should the court choose the reasonableness test (often called "ra-
tional basis" test), or should it choose the rightness test (called
also-substitution of judgment)?16  The United States Supreme
Court has never rendered an opinion which enunciated the factors
to be considered in persuading the court to use one or the other
scope of review.' 7
15. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
In the present case the Congress and its authorized agencies have
made determinations that take into account a wide variety of val-
ues. It is not for us to reappraise them.
16. The Reasonableness Test can be stated as: So long as there is any
rational basis in the agency's record for the judgment of that expert body
then the conclusion must stand. See, Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States,
307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939). The Rightness Test can be stated as: When the
dispute has to do with the meaning to be assigned to a legal concept or a
refinement of that meaning in the light of particular facts the court will
substitute its judgment for that of the agency and make the decision
anew. See, DAvis, supra note 1 § 30.01 at 190.
17. DAVis, supra note 1 § 30.01 at 192.
... [w]hatever explanation the Court may make when it reviews
an application of a legal concept to facts, the Court sometimes uses
L'Enfant clearly illustrates these two conflicting positions. The
trial court chose the reasonableness test; the appeals court chose
the rightness test.'8 For perspective, it is significant to relate the
trial court's "rational" test approach.
The trial court in L'Enfant, obviously avoiding separation of the
issue as a question of law, or a question of fact, or mixed, (which
strikes at the heart of the confusion of reviewing problems),19 sim-
ply looked at whether the agency's actions were reasonable.
... it would be an unnecessary exhibition of learning to cite au-
thorities for the elementary proposition that an agency charged
with carrying out a statute, and this urban renewal plan has the ef-
fect of a statute, has also the authority to construe the statute. The
courts give weight to its construction. In fact, if the construction is
reasonable, the courts will adopt it and will not determine the ques-
tion of interpretation de novo. It has been said that there is a ra-
tional basis for the ruling or decision of an administrative agency,
that ends the matter as far as the courts are concerned.20
This approach, although the easy way out, has great precedental
heritage.21 Underscoring its basis for determining that RLA's ac-
tion was "rational" the court says ". . . there is a definitive rul-
ing. . . whether this court would construe the restrictive clause in
the same way. . . is obviously immaterial.'22
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals, countered with the
rightness test, stating:
We think this was too limited a view of the court's function.
... [tjhis was not an agency decision arrived at pursuant to a sta-
tutory or otherwise established procedure for hearing and decision.
... [i]nstead, after informal discussions and correspondence, the
the reasonableness test. Id. § 30.14 at 269.
Possibly the most important factor that explains the choice ...(of tests) . . . is the judges state of mind with respect to agree-
ing or disagreeing with the administrative determination. Id. §
30.08 at 243.
In this writer's opinion, a classic reason was offered as justification for
choosing the reasonableness test in N.L.R.B. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
350 U.S. 164 at 269. "... the administrative determination does not seem
too farfetched."
18. L'Enfant, 300 F. Supp. 426 (DD.C. 1969), at trial level; 437 F.2d
698, 270 A.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1970), at appeals level.
19. Historically, courts have strived to separate questions of law and
of fact, claiming that questions of fact, usually, are not adjudicative. For
an excellent treatment, with citations to the existing confusion in the
courts, see, M. FoRxoscH, supra note 2, § § 339-341 at 735-744. See also,
A. DicKENsoN, ADN .TIsTRATnE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREmAcY OF LAW,
126-27 (1927).
20. 300 F. Supp. at 428 (D.D.C. 1969).
21. See, e.g., I.C.C. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 222 U.S. 541 (1912); Rochester
Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939); N.L.R.B. v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 164 (1956).
22. 300 F. Supp. 426 at 429 (emphasis added).
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agency merely expressed its opinion ... disclaiming in the same
breath that its action constituted a binding decision. No provision
... has been made for an administrative determination ...
Such a decision can thus be made only by the courts ... [t]he
decision is an independent one to be made by the court, and not a
mere supervisory examination of an agency to assure against ad-
ministrative caprice.23
In directing the district court the opinion continued:
The error of the District Court's approach ... is ... that it fore-
closed the receipt . . . of evidence conceivably relevant to the in-
terpretation question ...and should be explored by the District
Court on remand. 24
The dichotomy of approach is a sad documentation of the evolu-
tion of review of an agency decision. Of even graver concern, is
that the appellate court did not, would not, or worse, could not
articulate what specific criteria guided its choice of the "rightness"
approach. This, in effect, means that it plans to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency's. Unfortunately, this failure to es-
tablish criteria is typical.25
The basic concern of L'Enfant, although never explicitly articu-
lated, and at best vaguely implied, is procedural due process. The
appeals court surmised that the plaintiffs were not fully heard; i.e.,
certain reasonable procedures were not made available which
would have assured that the agency not act ultra vires and there-
fore have accorded petitioners the constitutional right of due
process. Disappointingly, this was not even made clear, when, in a
footnote, the court states: "The controversy ... is an instance of a
legal dispute ... for which no adjudicatory machinery has been spe-
cially provided by the Congress."26  Why did not the court un-
equivocally state its position at this point, i.e.-procedural due
process is violated? Instead, as frequently occurs, the court sub-
jects itself to the attack of abuse of constitutional authority.27
23. 437 F.2d 698 at 702.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. L. JAFFE, JuDcIAL REVIEW: QuESTION OF LAW, 69 -Ahv. L. REV. 239
(1955), in which Professor Jaffe, a recognized authority, attempts to re-
solve the perplexities. See also, DAVIs, supra note 1, § 30.07.
26. 437 F.2d at 702, quere: Can it be said that the appeals court is
directing the legislature with regards to statutory enactments? Is the court
slapping the legislature's wrist? Of these questions, this writer believes
that the former is the better point of view.
27. See, supra note 2 for references to detailed analysis.
Such confusion is needless in both this and future instances where
the court's concern is that the petitioner has had a fair hearing.
What constitutes a "fair agency hearing" so that a court, where
it finds "unfairness," may establish that its actions are not exceed-
ing the Constitutional judicial boundaries? There are authoritative
guidelines. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has stated that:
* . .[d]ue process ... is not a technical conception with a fixed
content .... [it] is not a mechanical instrument .... It is a deli-
cate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise ofjudgment by those whom . . . [are] entrusted with the unfolding
of the process.28
Thus, due process appears to possess considerable flexibility; this
is demonstrated even more clearly in Bauer v. Acheson when in re-
ferring to an agency's actions:
... the particular procedure to be adopted may vary as appropri-
ate to the disposition of issues affecting interests widely vary-
ing in kind.29
What the Supreme Court has done is to permit the agency to de-
velop its own procedures "so long, of course, as it observes basic re-
quirements designed for the protection of private as well as pub-
lic interest.' 30
Furthermore, a minor deviation can be no objection to what a
court considers a fair agency hearing.
* . .due process deals with matters of substance and is not to be
trivialized by formal objections that have no substantial bearing on
the ultimate rights of the parties.31
and
The Fifth Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure;
it protects substantial rights.3 2
A leading authority has characterized "fair hearing" accordingly:
(1) that the exercise of discretion is relevant to the making of pro-
cedural decisions;
(2) that ... a reasonable procedural decision should withstandjudicial interference; and(3) that reasonableness should be considered in terms of the re-
sponsibility of the agency for the total program, allowing for the
fact that the agency's resources are limited.3
28. Concurring opinion, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951).
29. 106 F. Supp. 445 (1952), citing F.C.C. v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1948).
30. Wallace Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
31. Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548,
562 (1945).
32. N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938).
33. L. JAFFE, supra note 2 at 567. (His conclusions resulted from a
study of the performance of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.)
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We might conclude that when a court grapples with the question
of whether a plaintiff has been accorded procedural due process by
an agency, it is essential that the court not compare agency pro-
cedure to the conventional manner by which courts conduct their
business. The gravamen of a determination of "fair agency proced-
ure" is whether there has been a substantial violation of rights;
otherwise, almost certainly, there would be an unreasonable con-
finement of the vitality so necessary to the administrative process.
V. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, is it not reasonable to expect that at least
in some instances an identification of lack of procedural due process
is possible? Assuredly, as in L'Enfant, mixed law and fact situa-
tions will produce unavoidable and difficult problems, but logically,
many of these problems can be surmounted by application of the
procedural due process principle. When the label is provided, the
judiciary thereby quashes qualms of exceeding constitutional au-
thority; in short, the court would be explicitly asserting its con-
stitutional authority to intervene at all. Consequently, its final
disposition of the matter would be less questionable since the
court is the petitioner's final resort. It cannot be overstated that in
these situations of review, which immediately induce constitu-
tional questions of separation of powers, it is the court's duty to
render that decision which is the least questionable. What could
be a better basis for precisely such action than the firm affixture,
"lack of procedural due process," where, in fact this is the court's
ultimate concern.
It is not to be denied that had the appeals court in L'Enf ant
stated its proper basis for action, this would have automatically pre-
cluded further controversy. For example, should the appeals
court have remanded in general for a new hearing to RLA rather
than to the district court?34  Should the appeals court have re-
manded to RLA with specific procedural instructions to be fol-
lowed?a5 Assuming remand to the District Court, should that court
34. In some instances, remanding to agency may be preferable par-
ticularly when the issue is technical, but fundamentally the procedure is
flexible. See, New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 at 335 (1947).
35. Such action is rare. The judiciary is severely condemned for
dictating procedures to 'administrative agencies in F.C.C., v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 140-4 (1940).
include review of the agency's record 6 or should it make an inde-
pendent determination, i.e., trial de novo?37 Such examples by
no means exhaust the variety of controversies that are brought into
issue.
However, such examples are significant since it is controversies
of this nature that the courts allow to rage as the penult of con-
cern, causing concomitant disparagement of the court's constitutional
authority. Conversely, the court in a L'Enfant situation, could un-
equivocally assert its basis for intervention-the violation of plain-
tiff's right to procedural due process, thereby limiting the confu-
sion and uncertainty currently obscuring the scope of judicial re-
view of agency decisions.
THOMAS R. GILL
36. It appears that such action would be acceptable. See, Baltimore and
Ohio R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349 (1936). The substantial evidence
rule would govern in this instance. For definition and related information,
see, Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); N.L.R.B.
v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962).
37. Such conduct also would be acceptable. Here the court decides
against utilization of the substantial evidence rule and instead decides
. .. upon its own record and the facts elicited before it." Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 64 (1932).
